

12 MAY 1971

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda


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12 MAY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 19)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 3 - 9 MAY 1971

<u>Moscow (3235 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1561 items)</u>	
VE Day	(--) 10%	Domestic Issues	(22%) 32%
May Day	(18%) 7.5%	[5th Anniversary	(--) 5%]
Indochina	(7%) 10%	Mao's "7 May"	
[U.S. Demonstrations	(.5%) 7%]	Directive	
CPSU Congress	(7.5%) 6%	Indochina	(39%) 27%
GDR Liberation	(--) 6%	[U.S. Demonstrations	(15%) 7%]
Anniversary		[1st Anniversary	(--) 9%]
French Foreign Minister	(--) 5%	Sihanouk's Government	
in USSR		Palestine Week	(--) 13%
Czechoslovak Liberation	(--) 4%	FRC-San Marino Consular	(--) 4%
Anniversary		Relations	
GDR SED Plenum	(--) 4%	U.S. Statement on Taiwan	(--) 4%
Middle East	(3%) 3%		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Continuing Vietnamese communist propaganda on the U.S. antiwar demonstrations sustains the theme that the "repression" of the protesters bears witness to the Administration's growing weakness and isolation. Claims of success for the demonstrations are most extravagant from LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY, which says the militants "paralyzed all activities of the government."

Moscow's propaganda on the protests moves to the level of authoritative central press comment, with articles by Yuriy Zhukov in PRAVDA and Matveyev in IZVESTIYA decrying countermeasures typical, in Zhukov's words, of a police state.

Peking, also focusing on police and military moves against the protesters, continues to avoid personal abuse of the President in international propaganda. But in domestic media it now lays the blame for "repressive" actions squarely at the President's door.

Chou En-lai and VWP First Secretary Le Duan alluded to U.S. as well as worldwide opposition to the war in speeches on 11 May during Le Duan's Peking stopover en route home from his lengthy stay in the USSR. Moscow reported Le Duan's departure from the USSR on the 9th after talks with Brezhnev.

The Vietnamese communist delegates at the Paris talks again took issue with President Nixon's insistence that there cannot be a total U.S. troop withdrawal until all U.S. prisoners are released. The propaganda on the session, however, continues to obscure U.S. and GVN proposals for the immediate release of sick and wounded prisoners and the transfer of some POW's to a neutral country. Hanoi radio on 12 May cited Stockholm reports to refute "the Americans' nonsensical allegation" that Sweden had agreed that prisoners could be interned there and that Swedish ships could be used to transport them.

Hanoi's claims of a strategically significant victory over Operation Lam Son 719 in southern Laos are repeated in Vietnamese communist comment marking the 7 May anniversary of the fall of Dien Bien Phu and in other propaganda seeking to demonstrate the failure of Vietnamization and pacification. Attention to fighting in South Vietnam centers on action in central Trung Bo; a 4 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article claims that the allied deployment in that area has become "passive and confused" and that Vietnamization has suffered "serious setbacks."

HANOI DENOUNCES TREATMENT OF PROTESTERS, WISHES THEM SUCCESS

In substantial continuing attention to the antiwar demonstrations in the United States, Vietnamese communist reports picture the measures

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against the protesters as actions of an embattled Administration under increasing pressure from an aroused public opinion. At the same time, messages and statements of support publicized in Hanoi and Front media wish success to the American antiwar efforts and demand the release of those under arrest.

REPORTAGE Current propaganda takes the form chiefly of news
& COMMENT reports on the scope of the demonstrations and the
 countermeasures. The only available commentaries--
one from Hanoi radio on 9 May and another carried by LPA on the
6th, broadcast in a fuller version by Liberation Radio on the
8th--echo earlier propaganda in acclaiming the demonstrations
and denouncing the treatment of the participants. The
Administration's reaction, says the Hanoi commentary, only
exposes its "further weakened and isolated posture."

Several VNA items report the spread of demonstrations to other cities but continue to focus on activities in Washington, briefly reporting such events as the marches to the Saigon embassy on the 6th and to Congress on the 5th. Some of the items, charging repressive treatment of the demonstrators, point to similar charges by Representatives Dellums and Abzug.

The Hanoi radio commentary says that despite "the massive repression and mass arrests"--it alleges that 14,000, a "record figure", have been arrested or detained--the demonstrators on 4, 5, and 6 May continued "their militant activities, stalling traffic along many streets in Washington." The LPA commentary is more categorical in its claim of success for such actions. Reporting the demonstrations in front of Congress, the White House, the Pentagon, and Selective Service headquarters, it says that "masses of American people blocked major highways and paralyzed all activities" of the government.

Predicting further isolation for the President if he pursues his Indochina policy, the Hanoi commentary concludes that the demonstrations have shown that "the American conscience is vigorously awakened" and that the President "has had to cope with a vigorously shaken rearbase" in addition to defeats on the battlefield. The Front commentary concludes that the recent demonstrations and the mass arrests on 3 May attest to the President's failure to "appease and defuse the American people's spring struggle." On the 11th, depicting Rev. Carl McIntire's "U.S. Administration-sponsored rally for a 'military victory'"

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as a "disastrous failure," Hanoi radio finds new proof that the majority of Americans firmly oppose their government's policy.

SUPPORT OF DRV Premier Pham Van Dong, according to VNA on
PROTESTERS 9 May, used the occasion of his "recent" reception of American scientists visiting North Vietnam to "warmly welcome" the spring offensive in the United States and to "wish the antiwar movement . . . ever stronger development and bigger success."* Other expressions of DRV support include a statement by the Vietnam Lawyers Association, publicized by VNA on the 7th, which calls the "brazen repressive acts" of the Nixon Administration "an invasion of civil liberties and gross violation of U.S. laws." It demands "the immediate release of all apprehended militants."

On 6 May VNA reported a meeting the previous evening at which Hanoi intellectuals protested the "repression" of the demonstrators. And on 9 May it recounted a rally held on the 8th in Hanoi by "large numbers of representatives of intellectuals and university students" to "warmly welcome" the spring offensive and denounce the "barbarous" countermeasures. The rally adopted a message to Dr. Spock and "his fellow peace militants" calling for an end to the Administration's "policy of repression against the American people" and demanding that it "set free all those who were illegally arrested" and end the war.

From the South come a cable and a statement issued by the South Vietnam People's Committee for Solidarity with the American People dated 4 and 6 May, respectively. The cable, addressed to the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice and broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 5th, "angrily" indicts the Administration for having "repressed the 3 May demonstrations" and arrested 7,000 people, specifically including Dr. Spock, Rennie Davis, and Abbie Hoffman.

The lengthier statement on "the Nixon Administration's repression of the antiwar movement" charges in more graphic terms that the President has "frenziedly" flouted the American people's demands. It says that on 3 May, "in compliance with Nixon's orders, tens of thousands of policemen and troops, using clubs, bayonets, tear gas, and even helicopters, barbarously repressed the demonstrators in Washington, wounding hundreds of them." It, too,

* Dong on the occasion of the 15 October, Vietnam Moratorium Day in 1969 had sent a message to the "American people," which welcomed the fall offensive and wished it success.

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records the arrest of 7,000 people on the 3d and says that "these terrorist acts" and the President's "odious, slanderous accusations against the antiwar Americans could not dampen but rather fueled the antiwar movement and have made upright and impartial Americans realize more clearly their responsibility to save the United States" from the war and "to take to the streets and resolutely struggle for peace and justice until total victory is achieved."

Registering the South Vietnamese people's "full support of the American people's just struggle," the statement demands that the U.S. Government "put an end to its terrorist acts and slanderous accusations and immediately release the Americans that have been illegally arrested and detained."

Vietnamese propaganda continues to depict support for the U.S. demonstrations from people in Saigon. A Liberation Radio broadcast to U.S. servicemen on the 5th publicized a purported message from a POW to his Congressmen asking them to back the antiwar movement.

SOVIET PRESS COMMENT DECRIES "REPRISALS" AGAINST PROTESTERS

While Soviet news coverage sharpens a portrayal of Administration-sanctioned police brutality against the U.S. antiwar demonstrators, central press comment by IZVESTIYA's Matveyev and PRAVDA's Yuriy Zhukov lend an authoritative cast to Moscow's denunciation of the official reaction. Moscow's more sharply critical comment is accompanied by publicity for statements by the Soviet Peace Committee, the Soviet War Veterans Committee, and Soviet "cultural leaders" expressing indignation at the "repression" and "victimization" of the demonstrators. The Peace Committee also sent a telegram to the Coalition for Peace and Justice decrying the "violence and terror."

Administration responsibility for the police "reprisals" and use of "concentration camps" is underscored, for example, in reports saying that Attorney General Mitchell directed the operations and that President Nixon "approved" of the police "arbitrariness." Moscow reported on 8 May that White House spokesman Ziegler said President Nixon was "satisfied" with the measures taken to disperse the protesters and "highly assessed" the actions of the police and military units. TASS comments that the President thus intimated that he would resort to the "toughest repressions" against antiwar protesters in the future.

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Zhukov's 6 May article in PRAVDA pictures police and "paratroopers" battling their own people in the center of their capital. Accusing the government of engaging in hypocritical talk about freedom and democracy while it throws troops against its own citizens and imprisons those who call for peace, Zhukov concludes that the Administration's "pyrrhic victory" has exploded the American "myth of freedom" and "illusion of democracy." Charging that the "American militarists" have turned their country into a police state, he remarks that "what happened in My Lai yesterday can happen tomorrow in the United States itself."

In the IZVESTIYA article, summarized by TASS on 10 May, Matveyev says the demonstrations exposed the lack of realism in Administration hopes that the American people would become reconciled to the war and dramatized the "ever-mounting crisis" besetting the country. In a similar vein, a panelist in the 9 May domestic service roundtable discussion said the demonstrations showed the failure of all the President's efforts over the past two years to inspire the confidence of the American people and to pacify the antiwar movement. Another panelist, assessing the practical impact the demonstrations can have on U.S. policy in Indochina, observed that the President would have to take into account what happened to his predecessor when he tried to ignore public opinion.

Commentators stress congressional criticisms of the treatment of the demonstrators. Zhukov in PRAVDA cites Representative Dellums as censuring the tactics of the police and Senator McGovern as calling the recent events the direct result of Administration inability to heed popular demands. TASS reports critical statements by Representative Abzug, Senators Metcalf and Kennedy, and others. As evidence of the impact of the demonstrations on Congress, TASS points to the coming Senate debate on the draft system, another "sharp political fight" looming over the McGovern-Hatfield bill on refusing allocations for pursuit of the war, and the work of Senators Cooper and Church on a new bill on the withdrawal of troops from Indochina.

PEKING DENOUNCES "BLOODY SUPPRESSION" OF U.S. DEMONSTRATORS

Peking's continuing reportage on the final week of the "gigantic" U.S. antiwar demonstrations has focused on the "large-scale suppression" of the demonstrators by "many military and police forces." Stressing that the demonstrators were of all ages and

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from all walks of life, Peking took note of the participation of servicemen, Vietnam veterans, and government employees.

Propaganda disseminated by NCNA's international service continues largely to abstain from personal abuse of President Nixon. Comment carried in the domestic media, however, has sought to lay blame for the treatment of the demonstrators directly at the door of the President. A report carried in the NCNA domestic service on 7 May called the President "the ringleader in this large-scale suppression," noted that "he hid himself in the western White House" and "directed this suppression" from there, and charged that "with an ugly face" and "bloodstained hands" he "talked nonsense" in claiming that the United States "is not and will not become a police state" and that his government is 'opposed to any suppression.'" It termed the mass arrests in Washington "an outrage against the people, seldom seen in history," and called the President a "rascal" and "an evil god of war." This report has been broadcast to Korean and Vietnamese audiences in the Peking radio's international service.

In a similar vein, an article carried in the "worker-peasant-soldier battlefield" column, transmitted by the NCNA domestic service on 6 May, contended that "the blood of the Kent State martyrs was not wasted," that "Nixon's bloody suppression cannot intimidate the heroic American students," and that "the broad masses of American revolutionary students have clearly seen the true face of the butcher Nixon from their lessons of blood." Neither this article nor the 7 May report has been transmitted in NCNA's English service.

LE DUAN IN PEKING EN ROUTE HOME AFTER SIX-WEEK STAY IN USSR

NCNA announced the arrival of Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) First Secretary Le Duan in Peking on 10 May and talks with Chou En-lai the next day, followed by a banquet at which Le Duan and Chou both spoke. Moscow media, reporting Le Duan's departure from the Soviet Union "for home" on the 9th after talks with Brezhnev, recalled that he had come to the Soviet Union for the 24th CPSU Congress--he arrived on 27 March--but shed no new light on his activities in the weeks since the close of the congress.*

* For a review of the travels of the other Indochinese delegates since the congress, see the 5 May TRENDS, pages 9-10.

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TALKS WITH BREZHNEV Le Duan met with Brezhnev on the day of his departure for talks on "important questions pertaining to the international situation and to bilateral relations," according to TASS. Both leaders, the report said, reiterated their desire to "further develop militant friendship, solidarity, and all-round fraternal cooperation" between their parties. VNA's 10 May report of the meeting added that Brezhnev reaffirmed Soviet support for the Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian peoples' resistance until "complete victory." Where TASS described the atmosphere of the talks as one of "complete unanimity and cordiality," VNA characterized it as one of "militant solidarity and fraternal friendship."

Routine-level Moscow radio comment on the Brezhnev-Le Duan meeting stresses Soviet resolve to continue aiding the Vietnamese and points to Vietnamese gratitude for Soviet help. A broadcast on the meeting in Mandarin on 10 May remarked pointedly that Soviet support "has never been limited to lip service" but stopped short of directly attacking Peking's behavior. In other comment not pegged to the visit, however, Moscow continues routinely to attack the PRC for failing to join in united action to support the Indochinese.

ACTIVITIES IN PEKING The 10 May NCNA report of Le Duan's arrival in Peking mentions that he had come "from Moscow." In announcing the DRV delegates' departure from Peking en route to the CPSU congress on 27 March, NCNA had similarly noted that they were leaving "for Moscow"--a reflection of Peking's willingness to mute the Sino-Soviet rivalry in an Indochina context.*

Chou En-lai and Le Duan exchanged speeches at a banquet on the 11th following talks between a CCP Politburo group led by Chou and the members of the Le Duan delegation. The talks, NCNA said, proceeded "in an atmosphere which fully manifested the fraternal unity and militant friendship between the Chinese and Vietnamese parties." At the banquet Chou extended congratulations to the three peoples of Indochina "on their great victories" and particularly on the "brilliant victory won on the battlefields of

* See the 31 March TRENDS, pages 6-9, for a discussion of the stop in Peking of the Indochinese delegates to the CPSU congress and their attendance at a banquet there celebrating military victories in Indochina.

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Highway 9"; he predicted that the three peoples "will soon win new victories" over the United States. Calling the three peoples' war a "just war," Chou contended that the U.S. war was opposed by the people of the whole world, "including the people of the United States." In his speech in response Le Duan also alluded to the U.S. antiwar demonstrations, claiming that "we have defeated" U.S. imperialism "throughout the world and in the heartland of the United States."

OFFER ON POW'S SHUNNED AT PARIS, ATTACKED BY HANOI RADIO

Vietnamese communist accounts of the 6 May session of the Paris talks totally ignore the issue of internment of prisoners of war in Sweden, revolving around reports that Sweden had expressed willingness to let its territory be used for the internment of POW's and its ships for their transport. The communist accounts brush off the allied presentations* in standard fashion, stating that the U.S. and GVN delegates "repeated their absurd allegations made at the previous session aimed at prolonging and expanding the war." The accounts register the communist delegates' continued insistence that the United States must set a date for a U.S. troop withdrawal before the POW issue can be discussed. They also again denounced President Nixon's linkage of a total U.S. withdrawal to the release of all U.S. prisoners and to South Vietnam's capability for self-defense.

Hanoi radio on 12 May, however, cited reports from Stockholm in claiming that the Swedish Foreign Ministry and newspapers "have rejected the Americans' nonsensical allegation" that Sweden had "proposed" that U.S. prisoners "be released in Sweden." The broadcast also said the Swedish Foreign Ministry had informed the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm that the Swedish Government

* GVN delegate Lam again sought a response to his offer to repatriate 570 sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners and to transfer 1,200 North Vietnamese prisoners who have been in captivity for more than four years to a neutral country. Ambassador Bruce, in supplemental remarks during the give-and-take portion of the session, cited Lam's proposals and took note of the press reports that Sweden was willing to allow its ships and territory to be used for the transport and internment of prisoners. He mentioned President Nixon's "satisfaction" at these reports and his hope that Hanoi would promptly negotiate an agreement to take advantage of Sweden's humanitarian gesture. In later additional remarks, the Ambassador repeated his call for the DRV delegate to respond to Sweden's reported offer.

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"has never expressed its willingness to allow its ships to be used in transporting to Sweden" prisoners taken during the Vietnam fighting. The broadcast cited Swedish newspapers in denouncing as "a political trick" President Nixon's remarks, cited by press spokesman Ziegler at a news conference on 3 May, expressing satisfaction at the reported Swedish offer. Sweden, Hanoi quoted one Swedish paper as saying, has declined to take part in "Nixon's political maneuvers."

FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES AT DRV

Alleged U.S. activity in the DMZ from 3 to 10 May is denounced in protests issued by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 8 and 11 May, the latest in the continuing series of protests over U.S. actions against North Vietnam. The protest of the 11th also claims that U.S. jet fighters on 7 and 9 May "attacked with explosive and noxious chemicals a number of localities in Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces." (Hanoi radio claimed on the 12th that one U.S. plane was downed on 7 May and another on the 10th over Quang Binh Province, bringing Hanoi's total of downed U.S. planes to 3,394.)

Both statements charge that U.S. planes, including B-52's, bombed Huong Lap village--from 3 to 7 May and again from 8 to 10 May. Both also charge that U.S. artillery fired at villages "located in the demilitarized zone on DRV territory." The statement of the 8th says that U.S. artillery shelled Vinh Quang, Vinh Giang, and Vinh Son villages from "positions on the sea and south of the demilitarized zone"; the statement of the 11th claims that Vinh Son and Vinh Giang were hit, causing "losses in lives and property" to the local population. The statements "sternly condemn" these U.S. "acts of war" and demand a permanent end to all U.S. encroachments on DRV sovereignty and security.

VNA on the 10th carried an atypical report spelling out damages reportedly caused by U.S. strikes against the DMZ. Such charges and claims of damages are normally made only in official protests or war crimes communiques. Some of the dates cited and localities reportedly hit correspond with those mentioned in the foreign ministry spokesman's 11 May statement.

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VICTORIES, "HARDSHIPS" DISCUSSED ON DIEN BIEN PHU ANNIVERSARY

Hanoi marked the 7 May anniversary of the fall of Dien Bien Phu with the customary editorials in the party organ NHAN DAN and the army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. The NHAN DAN editorial used the experience of Dien Bien Phu to demonstrate that "the nearer we are to victory, the greater the effort we must make," and it predicted more "difficulties and hardships." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN claimed at the outset that victories of strategic significance have been won this year in northeastern Cambodia and on the southern Laos-Highway 9 front; but it observed, like NHAN DAN, that "many hard tests" lie ahead and added that "many strategically significant battles" must be won in order to "crush the Americans' aggressive will."

While it is not uncommon for Vietnamese communist propaganda to warn, as these editorials do, of future hardships and sacrifices, Hanoi and Front media only occasionally acknowledge that some in their ranks are reluctant to face more hardships. Such an acknowledgement appeared recently in an article attributed to Front commentator "Cuu Long," broadcast by the Liberation Radio in daily installments from 27 through 30 April. Urging increased ideological work, this article said that "a number of people" fear difficulties and hardships and that "rightist, passive thinking" must be overcome.*

Drawing lessons from the campaign against Lam Son 719 as well as from Dien Bien Phu, the 7 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial claimed that both demonstrated that weaponry is an important factor and that "to be able to fight big battles involving concentrated forces, the main force assault units must be equipped with a certain degree of weapons and other technical equipment." It went on to reiterate the stock dogma that the factor determining victory is man and his "fighting spirit." According to the paper,

* Occasional past references of this kind to unacceptable attitudes include, for example, an acknowledgment of the existence of "passive, rightist" thinking in an article in the South Vietnamese communist party organ TIEN PHONG, broadcast by the Front in January 1970. (See the 12 February 1970 FBIS SURVEY, pages 10-12.) In the earlier period, erroneous views emerging after the introduction of U.S. forces into the war in 1965 were discussed in a February 1967 article by Cuu Long, publicized in the Hanoi press and radio.

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the fighting this year has also demonstrated "the strength inherent in the coordination of combat among various battlefields" and that the Indochinese are able to "simultaneously open many battlefronts and engage themselves in large-scale combat on many battlefields."

COMMENT ON FIGHTING, "UPRISINGS" IN CENTRAL SOUTH VIETNAM

An article in the 4 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN reviews recent action in central Trung Bo, including provinces from Quang Nam in the north to Darlac and Khanh Hoa in the south. Acclaiming communist attacks in the highlands, it credits them with foiling allied clearing operations and forcing the ARVN to retreat to defensive positions. Alleged ARVN weakness is linked to battle losses during 1970 and to the Vietnamization program. The article explains that the U.S. forces began to shift the combat burden in the II Corps to the ARVN in late 1969 but that the South Vietnamese troops are still dependent on the United States and could not carry on when the Americans were "bogged down" in Laos and Cambodia this year.

The siege of ARVN Fire Base 6--designated Hill 1,001 by the communists--is highlighted by the army paper. It claims that the overrunning of the fire base breached the allied defense line northwest of Kontum, posing a "serious threat" to rear bases, and that this "critical situation" compelled the allies to commit the bulk of their forces in II Corps to the recapture of the position. The allied rescue operation, according to the article, was "rapidly thwarted." The paper credits the communist forces in the area with repulsing four waves of allied counterattacks and claims that "in the end" they "seized complete control over the battlefield."

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article also lists numerous "uprisings" and attacks on pacification in central Trung Bo and claims that "the implementation of the pacification program has been stalled in the highlands and in the coastal and delta areas." A Liberation Radio commentary on 11 May lauds 1 and 2 May attacks in Quang Da (the GVN's Quang Nam) on the GVN's "control and rural pacification network" in the Dai Loc military subsector. The "victory" is termed a blow to the pacification program in a key pacification area in the central Trung Bo delta.

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There is further comment on the 25 April assault on the ARVN's Lam Son officers' training center in Khanh Hoa, allegedly "annihilating" more than 500 officers and officer candidates. An 8 May Hanoi radio commentary, for example, praises attacks on such training centers as "painful blows to Nixon in his efforts to consolidate and develop the puppet army according to his Vietnamization scheme." It claims that the shortage of officers in the ARVN is becoming very serious.

COMMUNISTS CONTINUE TO CLAIM ARVN FORCES ROUTED IN CAMBODIA

Vietnamese communist propaganda continues to claim that ARVN forces engaged in Operation Toan Thang 1/71 (Total Victory 1/71) in northeast Cambodia have been severely defeated, and the Front radio amplifies claims of the results of these alleged losses.* A series of three articles on the alleged deterioration of the ARVN, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 4, 5, and 6 May, cites the "failure" of Saigon troops in Toan Thang as "incontestable proof"--along with the "defeat" of Lam Son 719--of the ARVN's ineffectiveness and low combat strength. Claiming that Saigon lost more than half its forces in Toan Thang and finally had to call off the operation, the 5 May article says the Cambodian fighting has demonstrated that the ARVN cannot avoid "heavy defeats," even when fighting under the most favorable conditions. It concludes routinely that the fighting in Laos and Cambodia has severely hurt the Vietnamization program.

Liberation Radio on 10 May broadcast a commentary attributed to the PLAF organ QUAN GIAI PHONG which details alleged defeats sustained in Cambodia by the ARVN's 3d Armored Brigade, noting that the brigade was one of three set up only this year. Earlier reports on the Cambodian fighting have mentioned engagements with the 3d Brigade and have identified it as the spearhead of Toan Thang. The 10 May commentary claims that 2,000 men of the 3d Brigade have been killed, wounded, or captured and that 300 of its tanks and armored cars have been destroyed. Five of the brigade's six armored companies have been "annihilated or badly mauled," according to the commentary.

* Communist claims of victories over Toan Thang 1/71 since its start on 4 February are documented in the 28 April TRENDS, pages 9-11.

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The QUANG GIAI PHONG commentary claims that despite fairly strong U.S. fire support, the 3d Brigade hesitated to advance swiftly to its objectives and therefore became ineffective and failed to surprise its adversary. When the brigade did engage in combat, the commentary adds derisively, it established a record for rapidly fleeing in disorder, leaving behind equipment and wounded troops. The commentary explains that the officers and men of the 3d Brigade "lost confidence in the protection provided by armored vehicles" and, when they were engaged in combat, abandoned the vehicles and fled. The armored forces suffered painful defeats even when operating in open fields, according to the commentary, and became easy targets for communist artillery whenever they grouped together.

PATHET LAO PUBLICIZES "NEW PROPOSAL" FOR LAOS SETTLEMENT

A "new proposal" on a political solution of the Lao problem is publicized in 12 May VNA and Pathet Lao news agency reports of a communique on a 26-27 April conference of the standing committees of the NLHS Central Committee and the Patriotic Neutralist Forces Alliance Committee.* The proposal, which contains two main points, appears to modify the Pathet Lao's stand put forth in the 6 March 1970 five-point program--a program consistently described by the NLHS as the "basis" for a settlement along with the 1962 Geneva agreements and "the present actual situation" in the country. The demand for withdrawal of U.S. troops is absent from the new proposal, which calls instead for a cease-fire.

The first point demands once again that the United States end its "intervention and aggression" in Laos and, "as an immediate step," completely and unconditionally end the bombing on the "whole territory" of Laos. It does not, however, go on to demand, as the five points do, that all U.S. advisers and military

* The proposal is presumably also included in a letter from NLHS Chairman Prince Souphanouvong to Prince Souvanna Phouma which was brought by Souphanouvong's "special envoy" Tiao Souk Vongsak, who returned to Vientiane on 8 May after an absence of more than three months. He had returned to Sam Neua on 21 January for "further instructions." Pathet Lao media have noted that the letter contains a "new initiative" but have yet to release its contents.

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personnel be withdrawn. This hardline demand had most recently been reiterated by Souphanouvong in a letter to Souvanna Phouma publicized on 28 March 1971, in which he called for the withdrawal of "all U.S. troops and Saigon and Thai troops" and said that "there cannot be the least basis for a settlement of the Lao problem among the parties concerned" as long as the troops remain. Souphanouvong had retreated in that letter from more moderate proposals made in November and December 1970 that talks could take place between representatives of the two princes in Khang Khay if the bombing and military activities were halted only for a limited period of time in limited areas of Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua Provinces.

The second main point of the current plan contains two parts, proposing that "immediately" after the bombing is stopped. (1) "the armed forces in Laos" effect a cease-fire and stop all acts encroaching on the other side's zone, and (2) "the Lao parties concerned" discuss the formation of a provisional coalition government and "other problems of mutual concern," including guarantees of the neutrality of Laos. The five-point program, after demanding an end to U.S. bombing and a withdrawal of U.S. troops, says that a provisional coalition government should be established "during the period from the restoration of peace to general elections for a national assembly."

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PRC FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RELATIONS FORMED WITH SAN MARINO; TALKS BEGIN WITH TURKEY

Peking has sought to sustain its diplomatic momentum with the announcement on 7 May of a recognition agreement with San Marino, followed the next day by a unique communique disclosing that talks have begun on establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey. The latter announcement, in the form of an NCNA dispatch citing a "press communique" without specifying a source or date, marks the first time in its current diplomatic campaign that Peking has explicitly reported the opening of negotiations on diplomatic recognition. On the same day as the NCNA report, the Ankara radio broadcast an announcement by the Turkish Foreign Ministry information office that the two countries had agreed to open talks on diplomatic relations after having concluded exploratory contacts.

The unique announcement on the opening of talks, while having the effect of putting further pressure on the two sides to reach a successful conclusion, may have been intended by Peking to promote a bandwagon trend among countries considering negotiations with the PRC on diplomatic recognition and fearful of being left behind. The publicized talks with Turkey might remind other members of NATO that two members of the alliance, Canada and Italy, were among the first three countries to recognize the PRC in the latter's current drive.

Peking may also hope that its signal is received in Iran, a country which the Chinese have recently been cultivating. Chou En-lai, speaking at a 30 April banquet welcoming the second sister of the Shah of Iran to visit the PRC recently, termed the visits "a friendly gesture of the Iranian Government" that will promote friendship between the two peoples and "friendly relations between the two countries." The wife of the Iranian premier accompanied the princess on this visit.

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SAN MARINO RECOGNITION The protocol on establishment of relations at the consular level between the PRC and San Marino followed the formula used in the PRC-Kuwait recognition agreement in March: San Marino recognizes the PRC Government as "the sole legal government of China," with no mention of Taiwan. In the protocol the PRC registers respect for "the policy of neutrality" pursued by San Marino, a point also made in the 9 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial hailing the recognition agreement. The editorial also played up themes that have been prominent in Peking's diplomatic campaign, endorsing the principles of peaceful coexistence and opposing power politics by the "superpowers." The editorial observed that in following these policies the PRC has established diplomatic relations with many countries and that its international relations are "developing and broadening daily." There was no mention of the Taiwan question.

The formula now used with San Marino and previously with Kuwait represents the third variation of this crucial issue in the current series of recognition agreements beginning with the one with Canada last October. The Canadian formula, followed subsequently in the cases of Italy and Chile, offered a compromise in which the PRC recorded its territorial claim to Taiwan while Canada recognized the PRC Government as "the sole legal government of China" and took note of its claim to Taiwan without endorsing it. A week after the announcement of the agreement with Canada, Peking released a communique on the establishment of relations with Equatorial Guinea in which the latter recognized the PRC Government as "the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people." This formula embodies Peking's preferred terms,* as indicated by its use in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial commenting on the agreement with Canada and arguing against any "two-Chinas" solution. Subsequent recognition agreements with three more African countries adopted this formula, suggesting that it is used where Peking is in a relatively strong bargaining position and need not compromise.

* Taipei mirrors Peking's position regarding the scope of representation of a Chinese government. In a statement on 10 May the ROC declared that it is "the sole legal government representing all the Chinese people."

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The Kuwait formula appears to be the most flexible of the three,* in effect leaving the Taiwan question even more open than in the case of the Canadian formula. It may be, however, that Peking has switched from the latter formula not so much for the purpose of gaining more latitude in negotiating with other countries as out of sensitivity to the speculation aroused by a formula in which a country merely "takes note" of the PRC's claim to Taiwan. Peking's comment focused on the Taiwan question betrays in forceful terms its concern lest the international community should seek an accommodation on this issue that would seriously prejudice its irredentist objectives. In the absence of a recognition agreement meeting its optimum terms, Peking may prefer to sidetrack the Taiwan question rather than to use a formula that suggests a willingness to compromise on a matter of such concern. In following this strategy Peking might calculate on strengthening its hand for dealing with the China representation question by broadening its diplomatic standing across as wide a front as possible, thereby isolating Taipei and undercutting its leverage for resisting Peking's demands. It seems pertinent, in this connection, that the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials following the two agreements using the Kuwait formula ignored the Taiwan and the UN representation issues while focusing on points of mutual interest. These issues figured in some form in all the other editorials on recognition agreements.

The table on the next page shows the date on which Peking announced a recognition agreement, whether the other country had previously recognized the ROC, both the ROC and the PRC or neither, and the formula used in the agreement. Formula I is that in which the other country recognizes the PRC as "the sole legal government of China" and "takes note" of its claim to Taiwan. Formula II is that in which the other country recognizes the PRC as "the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people." Formula III is that in which the other country recognizes the PRC as "the sole legal government of China" but in which there is no mention of Taiwan. It will be noted that previous recognition of the ROC is not a criterion distinguishing the use of the various formulas.

* Peking's flexibility was underscored in an inadvertent manner in the agreement on diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. In the communique the Chinese expressed support for the government and people of "the Empire of Ethiopia in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism" (emphasis added). The Eritrean Liberation Front might see in this a rather bitter irony.

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FORMULAS USED IN RECENT RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS

Canada	13 Oct 70	ROC	I
Equatorial Guinea	20 Oct 70	Neither	II
Italy	6 Nov 70	ROC	I
Ethiopia	1 Dec 70	Neither	II
Chile	5 Jan 71	ROC	I
Nigeria	10 Feb 71	Both	II
Kuwait	29 Mar 71	ROC	III
Cameroon	2 Apr 71	ROC	II
San Marino	7 May 71	Neither	III

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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

ZHUKOV VIEWS OFFENSIVE WEAPON DEPLOYMENT FREEZE AS INADEQUATE

An article by Yuri Zhukov in the 5 May PRAVDA contains Moscow media's first--albeit brief--treatment in nearly three months of substantive issues under discussion at the fourth round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in Vienna. In the context of a warning about the "increasingly dangerous influence of the U.S. military-industrial complex" allegedly seeking to block any relaxation of tensions between the United States and the USSR, Zhukov belatedly mentions Senator Jackson's 15 April remarks again calling for a freeze on the deployment of offensive nuclear weapons of both countries. The Senator's speech, made in Washington before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, had not been reported before by Moscow media. Moscow had also failed to report Senator Jackson's television interview on 28 March and his speech on the Senate floor the following day in which he surfaced the plan for a one-year freeze on offensive nuclear weapon deployment.

Zhukov now says the Senator declared in his 15 April speech that the overall balance of strategic arms "is inclining in Moscow's favor." For this reason, he continues, the Senator proposed a freeze on offensive weapons "only on the territory of the United States and the USSR," ignoring altogether "the nuclear weapons which the United States keeps on its bases around our country." A 3 February article by V. Shestov in PRAVDA--triggering a spate of Soviet comment critical of the U.S. negotiating position on strategic arms limitation--had first broached the matter of weapons at U.S. overseas bases in the context of SALT, calling U.S. reticence to discuss the issue an attempt to gain "one-sided advantages" in the talks.* But the base issue was not treated in subsequent comment.

In addition to criticizing Senator Jackson, whom he labels "the Senator for the military-industrial complex," Zhukov levels an attack on Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia University as a member of "the new anti-Soviet campaign choir." Citing a recent

* For a discussion of the Shestov and related articles, see the TRENDS of 24 February 1971, pages 33-35; 18 February 1971, pages 29-30; and 10 February 1971, pages 22-24.

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article by Brzezinski in NEWSWEEK, Zhukov says he expressed the fear that the Soviet leaders, "particularly the Soviet military, are perhaps deliberately making use of SALT in order to achieve military 'superiority' over the United States." In effect, Zhukov adds, Brzezinski is "almost prayerfully tossing his government a little idea, even if it is in the form of an 'unprovable fear.'"

Zhukov concludes with the stock avowal that the USSR, for its part, supports the talks "with the aim of achieving mutually acceptable solutions." Recalling the CPSU Central Committee report to the 24th CPSU Congress, presented by Brezhnev on 30 March, he reiterates the standard line that talks such as those under way in Vienna can be productive if the security interests of the two sides are taken into account and no one seeks one-sided advantages.

Moscow otherwise devotes little current attention to SALT. Soviet media have not reacted to the New York TIMES story of 29 April that the USSR has proposed at Vienna a five-year treaty limiting U.S. and Soviet missile defenses to 100 interceptor missiles around the capitals of the two countries. Available Soviet accounts of Secretary Laird's 21 April speech before the American Newspaper Publishers Association and his 27 April Pentagon press conference ignored his remarks on SALT. They pointed up his warnings about a "Soviet threat" but did not give details of his charges that the USSR is involved in a new ICBM construction program and has resumed activity at ABM sites around Moscow.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

U.S. EFFORT TO ADAPT TO "REALITIES" OF SOME VALUE--ARBATOV

Currently there is a fairly substantial volume of Soviet press criticism of U.S. policy vis-a-vis the USSR. One such article is discussed in the preceding section of this TRENDS, the 5 May Zhukov article with its attack on the "military-industrial complex." These critical articles stop short of suggesting, however, that bilateral relations are endangered; on the contrary, an article in the 4 May PRAVDA by the Director of the Institute of U.S. Studies, Georgiy Arbatov, hails the "Leninist principles of foreign policy" set out at the CPSU Congress, including the call for normalizing relations with the United States and for resolving disputed questions by means of negotiations.

Among the critical commentaries is an article by Mayevskiy in the 5 May PRAVDA, appearing on the same page with the Zhukov article, which complains that the U.S. press is engaged in a "propaganda attack on the Soviet Union, . . . intimidating the American reader with the 'Soviet threat,' heating passions in the spirit of Shakespeare--not William but Frank, the USIA Director who issued instructions on launching an anti-Soviet campaign a long time ago." It was Shakespeare, Mayevskiy says, who insisted that the United States refuse to participate in this year's Moscow Film Festival on the grounds that previous festivals had shown films "exposing the U.S. military's bestialities." Also on 5 May, a lengthy article in LITERARY GAZETTE chronicles the alleged activities of the counselor for cultural affairs at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, McKinney Russell, aimed at recruiting a Soviet scientist. The latter article seems directed as much at Soviet citizens, warning of recruiting efforts of "friendly" Americans, as at Washington for engaging in espionage.

ARBATOV The Arbatov article deals at length with the
ARTICLE attempts of "American imperialism" to face
 up to the "new realities" which have evolved
over the past five years as a result of the change in
the balance of forces between the two socioeconomic
systems "in favor of socialism." Arbatov says that

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imperialism has not changed in nature and that U.S. imperialism in particular has sought merely to change its "forms and methods," to find "more cunning ways" to implement the same domestic and foreign policies. He observes that U.S. policy in Vietnam and the Middle East, and Washington's position on the strategic arms race and U.S.-Soviet relations, have "in essence become a means of assuaging the public and not a practicable program for the normalization of relations and of the international atmosphere."

Reminiscent of Foreign Minister Gromyko's 3 April CPSU congress speech, Arbatov goes on to discuss the ways to deal with imperialist endeavors to adapt to the new situation in the world. He says that attempts at deception must be unmasked, but he rejects the notion that the elements of realism in imperialist policies "must be refuted on the grounds that such attempts express a desire to preserve imperialism and to prevent new shocks and political failures." In his words, the imperialists' adaptations to reality are in fact "forced concessions made under pressure from the forces of peace and progress and objectively they may have consequences which meet the interests of the peoples."

MOSCOW ACCUSES U.S. IN SEA COLLISION IN KOREA STRAIT

TASS on 11 May carried a summary of a Soviet Foreign Ministry note protesting the "illegal actions" of a U.S. "warship" which collided with a "Soviet rescue vessel" in the Korea Strait on 6 May. According to the note, the actions of the U.S. ship endangered the safety of navigation on the high seas and were at variance with the generally recognized norms of international law. It demands that Washington take steps to prevent such incidents in the future, and it says the Soviet side reserves the right to demand compensation for damages. In the only available followup comment, an article in TRUD on the 12th, summarized by TASS, says that the collision occurred when a U.S. destroyer, in an attempt to photograph Soviet vessels, approached too closely. According to TRUD, the Soviet vessels involved in the incident were a transport refrigerator ship which was towing a floating dock and two accompanying "rescue ships."

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The last Soviet protest to the United States over a collision at sea to be publicized by Moscow came on 13 May 1967, when a government note complained that a U.S. destroyer taking part in joint U.S.-Japanese naval exercises in the Sea of Japan had damaged a Soviet destroyer on 8 May. In language more strident than the current protest, the 1967 note described the action of the U.S. ship as "premeditated" and "arrogant." While it demanded that the "guilty be punished" and steps be taken to prevent further "provocative actions," the 1967 note did not mention compensation.

On 14 November 1970, Moscow protested to London about a collision in the Mediterranean five days earlier between the British aircraft carrier Ark Royal and a Soviet destroyer, resulting in the death of two Russian seamen.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW CITES CAIRO PRESS AS SEEING NO CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY

Moscow draws heavily on Arab press comment in its propaganda on Secretary Rogers' Middle East tour to convey the impression that the trip was essentially unproductive, that the American stand is unchanged, and that through continued political and military support the United States still encourages Israel's resistance to a peaceful settlement, rather than pressuring it to implement the Security Council resolution. Cairo comment, as quoted by Moscow, says the United States is seeking only to protect its interests--particularly oil--in the area, points to a gap between actual U.S. policy and American diplomatic assurances, and notes that there are marked differences in the U.S. and UAR positions on a settlement.

While contriving to present the tour in negative terms, Soviet commentators refrain from speculating on the results of the trip. A panelist on the 9 May domestic service commentators' roundtable observes that it is difficult "as yet to assess the real results" of the mission, and a domestic service commentator on the 11th remarks that foreign news agencies continue to guess at the content of the Secretary's report to the President. A foreign-language commentary the same day attributes to "Western political observers" the view that Mr. Rogers failed to dispel Arab skepticism regarding U.S. policy, and an Arabic-language broadcast that day declares that the visit strengthened the positions of those who believe that the Arabs cannot expect any charities from the United States. Like other comment, this broadcast points to the "obvious partiality" in the Secretary's trip to Sharm ash-Shaykh and the Arab part of Jerusalem, claiming that "even anti-Arab papers" described this as recognition of Israeli claims to these occupied Arab territories. A Yefremov domestic service commentary on the 9th, referring to Rogers' "flight over occupied Arab territories" to Sharm ash-Shaykh, assails the "treachery of American diplomacy" in pretending to question Israel's territorial claims, and rhetorically asks who gave Washington the right to decide the destiny of the Arab lands.

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There is again some suggestion of sensitivity to the idea of U.S. mediation supplanting the mission of Dr. Jarring, a Glukhov article in PRAVDA on the 12th, as reported by TASS, claiming that the Arabs regard Washington's intention to pose as mediator as "quite clumsy, to say the least." A foreign-language commentary by Arkadyev on the 11th, recalling that the Secretary said in Cairo that the United States is resolved to continue supporting the Jarring mission and strives for a lasting peace, argues that this statement does not show the slightest change in U.S. policy. Noting that Rogers said the U.S. stand remains that outlined in President Nixon's foreign policy message in February, Arkadyev--like TASS in a 5 May report--describes the message as confirming a course designed to insure Israeli military superiority "under the guise" of preserving the military balance of forces.

The Secretary's activities in Cairo and Israel, his stopover in Rome, and his report to the President on his return are briefly reported by Moscow. Assistant Secretary Sisco's return to Cairo for talks on the 9th is also noted only briefly, Moscow reporting that he acquainted the Egyptian leadership with the results of Rogers' talks in Israel and going on to cite the EGYPTIAN GAZETTE as saying that those talks contributed nothing new to a settlement.

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ROMANIA

CEAUSESCU REAFFIRMS INTENT TO PURSUE INDEPENDENT COURSE

In a lengthy address on 7 May marking the 50th anniversary of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), party chief Ceausescu made an unusually strong restatement of Romania's right to pursue its independent course and of its resolve to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The speech, broadcast by Radio Bucharest, was notable for its emphasis on Romania's right to develop military cooperation outside the framework of the Warsaw Pact and to develop its own national forces. It was also noteworthy for its emphasis on the impermissibility of interference in the internal affairs of other parties as well as for an unusual warning against party factionalism. In contrast to negative reaction from Moscow and its hard-core allies to recent U.S.-Chinese contacts, Ceausescu used the occasion to hail these developments as a "positive step" in the interests of cooperation among states and peace.

Ceausescu's strong reaffirmation of Romania's own national course and independent views came against the background of its expanding relations with China, including military contacts, a Chinese grant of a long-term credit, and the recent announcement that Chinese technical personnel are to be sent to Romania. Soviet displeasure over Romania's contacts with the PRC were reflected in a 23 April article in the Soviet weekly NEW TIMES, entitled "Peking's Diplomatic Game," which complained that the Chinese are trying to divide the socialist community by using "a differentiated approach." In an allusion to Romania, the article observed that the Chinese are "coaxing some and granting them credits" while "abusing and blackmailing others."

Ceausescu's remarks also came against the backdrop of continuing Romanian refusal to join all the other Warsaw Pact members who rallied to Moscow's cause by answering Chinese polemics during the recent CPSU congress. Another factor possibly involved in Ceausescu's strong defense of his policies may be speculation that Romania served as an intermediary between China and the United States. Moscow pointedly took note--in a TASS dispatch published in PRAVDA on 1 May--of a statement by Edgar Snow in a LIFE magazine article on recent talks with Mao that certain unnamed "go-betweens" had been conveying messages from Washington to the PRC.

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ROMANIAN
INDEPENDENCE

As he had done on other anniversary observances, Ceausescu began his speech by playing up the RCP's role and minimizing the Soviet contribution to Romania's liberation during World War II. Although he expressed gratitude to "the glorious Soviet armies" for their sacrifices, he went on to add that "our party was the organizer and soul of all actions undertaken by the people and army; the patriotic forces and army quickly liberated the capital and other centers in the country." He added that "the Romanian Army, along with the Red Army, carried on difficult struggles for the liberation of the fatherland, and took part in the liberation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia." The point of Ceausescu's reading of history seems to be that Romania is grateful for Soviet assistance but has earned the right to pursue its own policy.

Ceausescu seemed particularly concerned to dispel any notion that Romania is moving closer to the Soviet orbit--a view that figured in speculation in the Western press following Bucharest's belated decision to join the CEMA investment bank. On the question of Romania's possible renunciation of its principles, he commented: "How could we give up water and air? It would mean giving up life; therefore we cannot give up these principles, because they constitute our independent and free life."

In his remarks on party relations Ceausescu forcefully restated his view that under present conditions "a center within the communist movement is no longer either necessary or possible." Since conditions in each country differ, he argued, each party "adopts a differentiated political line, strategy, and position." He stressed that should individual parties encounter difficulties, other parties (read: the CPSU) have the duty "to avoid any interference in the domestic affairs of the respective party, not to encourage dissension under any circumstances." In effect reaffirming that the Romanians will not join in polemics against China, Ceausescu noted that the RCP was "wrong" to have participated in attacks on other "fraternal parties" in the past.

As if to underline the correctness of Romania's policy toward China, he noted a general tendency in the world to normalize relations with the PRC. He unqualifiedly endorsed recent PRC-U.S. contacts as a "positive" first step, a view that contrasts with the negative comment issuing from Moscow and its orthodox allies. He generalized this view by saying that normalization of relations with the PRC, "without whose participation the solution of the great problems of international life cannot be conceived today, corresponds to the cause of cooperation among states and to peace."

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RELATIONS WITH
SOCIALIST STATES

Turning to relations within the Soviet bloc, Ceausescu went on to repeat familiar assurances of Romanian willingness to promote "cooperation" within CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, but he pointedly defended Bucharest's right to pursue economic and military relations outside the bloc framework. He noted that in developing cooperation with CEMA members "Romania keeps in mind that this organization embraces only a part of the socialist countries," adding that Romania "will continue to expand its cooperation with the other socialist countries." Arguing blandly that as the Warsaw Treaty statutes show, the Pact has "a temporary nature," he added: "We must understand that it is necessary to concern ourselves with the steady strengthening of our national army, to develop and strengthen cooperation and the exchange of experience with the armies of all the socialist countries regardless of their belonging or not belonging to this treaty, because after the abolition of the NATO and Warsaw treaties as well, national armies will continue to exist for a long time . . . and we will develop and strengthen their capacity as long as we do not achieve the liquidation of the armies of the world."

This line defends Romania's practice of "exchanging" military experience with the maverick Yugoslavs, but Ceausescu may have been primarily concerned to justify increased contacts with the Chinese. Defense Minister Ionita visited China in July 1970, and a Romanian military delegation "vacationed" there in October. On the eve of the 24th CPSU Congress, Deputy Premier Radulescu made his second Peking visit in less than five months, resulting in an announcement that Chinese technical personnel are to be sent to Romania. The second-ranking Chinese official in the talks was Politburo member Chiu Hui-tso, PLA deputy chief of staff in charge of logistics, who accompanied Chou En-lai on his recent visit to Hanoi.

Immediately following his remarks on the need to strengthen the Romanian Army, Ceausescu cited the need to improve security organs, "to perfect their activity aimed at foiling the actions of any hostile elements which dare plot against our system." He also promised to strengthen the militia, "which may be called upon to act against antisocial elements and defend public peace."

DANGER OF
FACTIONALISM

Noting that the Romanian party's unity had been weakened by factionalism in the course of its history, Ceausescu added: "Based on this experience, our party pays particular attention to the steady strengthening of the unity of its ranks, deeming this to be one of the basic conditions for fulfilling its mission Therefore, we do not

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allow and we will not allow any kind of action which could weaken unity and the fighting capacity of the party."

As if to underline the point that the party is united around Ceausescu and his independent policies, Radio Bucharest reported on the 6th that at the proposal of the party Central Committee, the State Council established the new titles "Hero of the Socialist Republic of Romania" and order of "Victory of Socialism"-- both of which were promptly conferred on Ceausescu. In proposing the honors for Ceausescu before the Central Committee, Premier Maurer hailed the party chief's "courage" in conceiving and carrying out his policies.

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J A P A N C P

JCP REBUTS "SLANDEROUS" CCP ATTACK, ISSUES COUNTERCHARGES

An article in the 8 May issue of AKAHATA, organ of the Japan Communist Party, has further widened the ideological gulf between the JCP and the Chinese Communist Party.* AKAHATA sought to rebut criticism of the JCP made in a joint RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial article published 18 March to mark the centenary of the Paris Commune.

Peking's article had stressed the role of violence in seizing and maintaining political power and criticized those "revisionists and renegades" who hope to take the parliamentary road to power. The article specifically pointed to the JCP as an example of modern revisionism within the communist movement and condemned the "Miyamoto revisionist clique," for opposing "violent revolution" and taking the "parliamentary road."

Peking's joint article also singled out for specific condemnation the JCP's attempt (announced by AKAHATA in March 1970) to provide new official translations for key Marxist terms. The JCP's wish to retranslate the term "violent revolution" because of its current connotation of "brute force" or "lawless force" was condemned as representative of the JCP's efforts to pacify the Japanese people. The search for a new translation for the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" was portrayed as an attempt "to oppose the Japanese people making revolution" by falling "back on semantics and juggling with words."

In response to these charges, the 8 May AKAHATA article lashes out at "the Maoists' theory" that violent revolution is the only way to achieve political power; such a theory, it says, has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism and constitutes "a misuse of the experiences of the Paris Commune." Claiming that Maoists approve of "nothing but violent revolution," AKAHATA charges the CCP with ridiculing the entire election process

* JCP-CCP relations deteriorated rapidly in the early stages of the cultural revolution. Chinese polemical attacks on the "revisionist" leadership of the Japanese party began early in 1967 and were quickly followed by sharp AKAHATA counterattacks.

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"in which millions of people participate in Japan" and with slandering the JCP by portraying it as a "parliamentary fanatic." Noting that the CCP attack came at a time when elections are being held within Japan, AKAHATA declares that "slander of this kind is an unpardonable insult to the millions of Japanese who are participating in the elections."

AKAHATA goes on to defend its right to seek new translations for Marxist terms and rejects the CCP's charge that the endeavor is an "etymological sham." The article argues that a new translation for such terms as "proletarian dictatorship" must be found to prevent reactionaries within Japan from misleading the masses into thinking that "a brutal and dark tyranny" will be established "once socialism is achieved." "No other party has the right to poke its nose into this problem," which is "completely an internal affair," AKAHATA affirms. It condemns the "chauvinist arrogance" of the CCP for "pretending to be a supreme judge over the revolutionary movements of the world."

Not surprisingly, the JCP's version of the historical legacy of the Paris Commune supports the parliamentary methods with which the party has identified itself in recent years. AKAHATA argues that the Paris Commune "denied neither the parliamentary system nor its election system" as it "converted the parliament from a debating society into an organization for action." The JCP, AKAHATA asserts, will continue to follow the parliamentary road and work to achieve political power through a united front of popular forces participating in elections: "A democratic coalition government is not yet a people's government, but it is certainly a bridgehead for the people to form such a government."

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PEOPLE'S DAILY NOTES FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF MAO DIRECTIVE

The fifth anniversary of Mao's "7 May directive" was welcomed by a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial which warned that continued ideological study by cadres is a requisite, notwithstanding past successes toward the achievement of cultural revolution goals. The directive, a basic document of the cultural revolution, was contained in a letter to Lin Biao, dated 7 May 1966; it called for an end to overspecialization in any single field of activity and for the inclusion of politics in all occupations and studies, with special reference to the PLA.

The only previous anniversary editorial on the directive appeared on the occasion of the first anniversary in 1967. This year's editorial, rather than signaling any change in domestic priorities, probably reflects the usual Peking practice of taking special note of quinquennial anniversaries. Nonetheless, its publication at this time serves to provide an additional bit of evidence that the ideals which sparked the cultural revolution retain some of their former potency.

The May 4th Movement did not rate an editorial this year, its 52d anniversary, but a number of items in national and provincial media did note the importance of youth and the progress being made in rebuilding the Young Communist League (YCL) under party supervision. A 3 May Shensi radio report on a Sian middle school was perhaps the most informative of these, making it clear that the YCL is now a highly elite organization with the Red Guards acting as a much broader body for encouraging mass political interest. While half of the students in the school are Red Guards, only about one in 20 are YCL members; in fact, the YCL has only one-third the membership it had prior to the cultural revolution. The Shensi broadcast observed that the party branch had recently tightened controls over the youth organizations so that they could better fulfill their task of educating youths 12 to 17 years old in the meaning of revolution and class struggle.

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